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Abstract
We study the limits of an information intermediary in Bayesian auctions. Formally, we
consider the standard single-item auction, with a revenue-maximizing seller and n buyers with
independent private values; in addition, we now have an intermediary who knows the buyers’
true values, and can map these to a public signal so as to try to increase buyer surplus. This
model was proposed by Bergemann et al., who present a signaling scheme for the single-buyer
setting that raises the optimal consumer surplus, by guaranteeing the item is always sold while
ensuring the seller gets the same revenue as without signaling. Our work aims to understand
how this result ports to the setting with multiple buyers.
Our first result is an impossibility: We show that such a signaling scheme need not exist
even for n = 2 buyers with 2-point valuation distributions. Indeed, no signaling scheme can
always allocate the item to the highest-valued buyer while preserving any non-trivial fraction of
the original consumer surplus; further, no signaling scheme can achieve consumer surplus better
than a factor of 12 compared to the maximum achievable. These results are existential (and
not computational) impossibilities, and thus provide a sharp separation between the single and
multi-buyer settings.
On the positive side, for discrete valuation distributions, we develop signaling schemes with
good approximation guarantees for the consumer surplus compared to the maximum achievable,
in settings where either the number of agents, or the support size of valuations, is small. For-
mally, for i.i.d. buyers, we present an O
(
min(log n,K))-approximation where K is the support
size of the valuations. Moreover, for general distributions, we present an O
(
min
(
n log n,K2))-
approximation. Our signaling schemes are conceptually simple and computable in polynomial
(in n and K) time.
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1 Introduction
Consider a seller selling an item to a buyer, whose private value V is drawn from some known
distribution D. The overall social welfare is maximized when the seller sells the item for $0. In
contrast, to maximize the (average) revenue, the seller’s optimal strategy is to sell at a revenue-
maximizing price, which may lead to welfare loss due to the item going unsold.
More generally, in a single-item Bayesian auction with n buyers with independent private valu-
ations, a welfare-optimal mechanism is the second-price (or VCG) auction, which always gives the
item to the highest-valued buyer. In contrast, even when the buyers have i.i.d. regular (continuous)
valuations, the revenue-optimal mechanism was shown by Myerson [15] to be a second-price auction
with a reserve price; this may lead to the item going unsold. The situation is more complex for
non-i.i.d. buyers, where the revenue-optimal mechanism may in addition sell the item to a buyer
with lower value than the highest, leading to more welfare loss. We visualize this via a revenue-CS
trade-off diagram (Fig. 1b), where, for different mechanisms and value distributions, we plot ex-
pected consumer-surplus (i.e., value minus payment), denoted CS, versus expected seller-revenue,
denoted by R. Any welfare-maximizing mechanism including VCG (point V ) lies on the 135◦ line
with interceptW∗, the maximum welfare. In contrast, Myerson’s mechanism (point M) has revenue
RM greater than that under VCG, but also lies strictly below the maximum-welfare line.
Information Intermediary. Now consider the same setting, but with an additional information
intermediary : a third-party who knows the true buyer values ~V = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn) and can provide
a “signal” or side-information to the seller and the buyers. Both the signal and signaling scheme
are common knowledge to all agents (buyers and seller), who can thus use Bayes’ rule to update
the prior over valuations given the signal. The signal “re-shapes” the joint prior over the buyer
valuations in a Bayes-plausible manner (i.e., such that the posterior averaged over signals equals
the prior). Given the signal, a seller can then propose the revenue-maximizing mechanism, and
buyers bid optimally, under the posterior distribution. We illustrate this in Fig. 1a.
Formally, consider a setting where n buyers have independent private valuations ~V drawn from
a distribution D = D1×D2×· · ·×Dn. The valuations ~V are known to the intermediary, who maps
them to a signal σ via a public signaling scheme Z. Given σ, all agents compute the posterior S
over buyer values; note these can now be correlated. The seller then proposes a mechanism MS
(comprising allocation and payment rules) which maximizes the expected revenue assuming buyers
act in a manner which is ex-interim incentive-compatible (IC) and individually-rational (IR) given
S. If σ is such that S = D, then MS is Myerson’s auction (point M in Fig. 1b); on the other
hand, if the signal fully reveals ~V , then the seller can extract full surplus (i.e., get revenue W∗,
point A in Fig. 1b). Moreover, the seller gets revenue at least RM under any signaling scheme, as
she can always ignore the signal (see Section 2). Thus any signaling scheme Z must give a point in
the shaded triangle with consumer surplus CS(Z) and revenue R(Z), and the maximum possible
surplus Opt is achieved at point O in Fig. 1b. Now we can ask:
What revenue-CS trade-offs can an information intermediary achieve via signaling?
More specifically, what is the maximum possible consumer surplus that is achievable?
In the single-buyer case, Bergemann, Brooks and Morris [1] completely answer these questions
by showing that the entire shaded region is always achievable. In particular, the point O is met by
a simple signaling scheme where the revenue is exactly RM , and the item is always sold thus the
mechanism is efficient.
In this work we study the effectiveness of an information intermediary in a multi-buyer (i.e.,
n ≥ 2 buyers) Bayesian auction. In brief, we expose a sharp separation between the single and
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Figure 1: (a) The auction with information intermediary setting, where the intermediary has full knowledge
of valuations ~V , and can use this to provide a signal σ to the seller and the buyers. The seller then uses the
revenue-optimal mechanism MS for the posterior distribution over valuations S given σ.
(b) Two-dimensional space of seller revenue, R, and consumer surplus, CS, of different signaling schemes.
The points M and V correspond to the Myerson and VCG mechanisms, and the point A corresponds to
selling to the highest-valued buyer at her value when the seller has full information.
multi-buyer settings, as in the latter, no signaling scheme can guarantee more than a constant
fraction of the optimal consumer surplus (Opt in Fig. 1b). On the positive side, we obtain a novel
yet simple signaling scheme with strong approximation guarantees for a wide range of settings.
While our main focus is on theoretical results, our work has broader practical relevance. Con-
sider for example an agency like the FCC with privileged information about bidders in a spectrum
auction, or a bid optimizer working for multiple competing clients in an ad-exchange. These inter-
mediaries have private information about the buyers, and can selectively release it to influence the
auction. Our work also fits in a broader space of multi-criteria optimization where a third-party
platform or government agency can release information about agents to a principal in charge of an
activity such as admissions or hiring, so as to trade-off the principal’s objective such as maximizing
quality of hire, with a societal objective such as fairness or diversity.
1.1 Our Results
We consider a single-item auction with n buyers with discrete valuations. We assume the buyer
valuations are independent, so D = D1×D2× · · · ×Dn, where Di has support size Ki, and the size
of the union of the supports is K. We parametrize our results in terms of n,Ki, and K.
Our first set of results (Section 3) shows a sharp demarcation between the cases of n = 1 and
n ≥ 2 buyers. In contrast with the former case (where signaling achieves the entire shaded region
in Fig. 1b), we show in the latter case, the entire segment BO is not achievable; indeed, the only
achievable points on segment AO are arbitrarily close to A. Therefore, achieving full welfare needs
sacrificing an arbitrarily large fraction of consumer surplus compared to the no-signaling baseline.
Theorem 1. For n = 2 buyers each with Ki = 2, for any given constant ε > 0, there are instances
where any signaling scheme Z under which the revenue-optimal auction obtains full welfare (i.e.,
allocates to highest-value buyer), has CS(Z) ≤ ε ·CS(D), where CS(D) is the consumer surplus of
Myerson’s auction without signaling.
We next ask if we can sacrifice on welfare, but raise a consumer surplus arbitrarily close to
Opt? We again answer in the negative, and show a lower bound of 2 on the approximation ratio.
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Theorem 2. For n = 2 buyers each with Ki = 2, for any constant ε > 0, there are problem
instances where any signaling scheme Z has CS(Z) ≤ (12 + ε) ·Opt.
We note that the above results are existential impossibility results, and do not depend on the
complexity of the signaling scheme. Given these negative results, we focus on approximating the
consumer surplus. To this end, we propose novel signaling schemes, which, informally, achieve a
constant-approximation to Opt when either the number of buyers n is a constant (with arbitrary
support size K), or when K is a constant (for arbitrary n). Formally, our main result, presented in
Sections 4 and 5, is the following:
Theorem 3. There are signaling schemes that achieve the following approximations to Opt:
1. O
(
min(log n,K)) when Di’s are identical; and
2. O
(
min
(
n log n,K2)) when Di’s are arbitrary.
Further, this signaling scheme has computation time polynomial in n and K.
1.2 Intuition and Techniques
For any n, the optimal signaling scheme for maximizing surplus can be obtained via an infinite-
sized linear program (see Eq. (2) in Section 3) with variables for every possible signal, i.e., every
possible joint distribution over buyer valuations. Further, for each such signal, the quantity of
interest is the consumer surplus of the revenue-optimal auction given the signal. For n = 1 case,
Bergemann et al. show this LP has a special structure in that it admits a basis comprising of
“equal-revenue distributions” containing the revenue-maximizing price (see Section 2.2). Our work
shows that this breaks down for optimal auctions with signaling involving n ≥ 2 buyers.
To understand why things change dramatically from n = 1 to n ≥ 2 buyers, in the former
case, the optimal mechanism is a simple posted price scheme and its revenue is continuous in the
distribution D. However, with multiple buyers, the optimal auction does not have simple structure
even for independent buyers (see Algorithm 1), and we need to analyze the consumer surplus of this
auction, which can be a discontinuous function of the prior. (See Section 3 for examples.) Further,
for correlated buyers, the revenue of the auction itself may not be continuous in the prior! Indeed,
a celebrated result of Cre´mer and McLean [7] shows that slightly perturbing an independent prior
to a correlated one can discontinuously increase the revenue to W∗, hence decreasing consumer
surplus to 0. (See Theorem 4 in Section 2.) This makes it tricky to reason about the optimal
signaling scheme, leading to the gap between our upper and lower bounds.
In more detail: Our proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 use a special case of the Cre´mer-McLean
characterization [7]: for n = 2 buyers each with Ki = 2, under any non-independent prior the
seller can extract full social surplus as revenue. This lets us focus on signaling schemes where
buyers remain conditionally independent given each signal. Using Myerson’s characterization of
the optimal auction for discrete valuations [12], we show a structural characterization that reduces
the space of optimal signals to a sufficiently simple form, yielding the desired counterexamples.
Theorem 3 is technically the most interesting result in the paper. At a high level, our scheme
balances the trade-off between revealing enough information about valuations so that the item is
sold to a high-value buyer, and revealing too much information such that the seller extracts all
the surplus. Balancing these is delicate; nevertheless, we show simple schemes, with polynomial
computation time and signal complexity.
Our schemes involve choosing a threshold value corresponding to that of the (t+ 1)st buyer in
descending order (for carefully chosen t), and then applying the single-buyer signaling scheme in [1]
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to the excess value (i.e., value minus threshold) of a randomly chosen buyer in the top t (while
leaving the rest unchanged). Note that though the posterior conditioned on signal is a product
distribution, it requires the intermediary to observe all the buyer valuations. We present this basic
scheme in Section 4. To show our bounds that depend on n, we use an appropriate randomization
over such schemes, while the bounds depending on K follow from a concentration lemma over
independent Bernoulli trials (Lemma 6 in Section 5.1), which may be of independent interest.
1.3 Related Work
The general problem of information structure design considers how sharing additional infor-
mation can influence the outcome of a mechanism. Different variants of this problem have been
formulated and studied; we refer the reader to [3, 9] for surveys. Of particular importance to us
is the Bayesian persuasion problem formulated by Kamenica and Gentzkow [14], where a receiver
selects a utility-maximizing action based on incomplete information about the state of nature. A
sender who knows the state of nature can signal side-information to the receiver so that the action
taken by the receiver is utility-maximizing for the sender. This general problem has been widely
studied in different domains such as bilateral trade and advertising [1, 6, 18]. For this problem,
there is a distinction between existence and computational results, and the work of [11] studies the
computational complexity of finding the optimal signaling scheme under different input models.
The restriction of our problem to one buyer is termed “bilateral trade”. Here, the intermediary
is the sender whose utility is consumer surplus, and the seller is the receiver whose action space
is take-it-or-leave-it prices and whose utility is revenue. Beginning with the work of Bergemann
et al. [1], several works [10, 16, 8, 5] have considered various extensions and modifications to this
basic problem. Unlike bilateral trade where the buyer is perfectly informed, in our setting, not only
the seller, but also all the buyers are receivers, in the sense that they have imperfect knowledge
of the true valuations of other buyers, and modify their respective bidding strategies in response
to the intermediary’s signal to maximize their own utilities. Our setting is therefore a Bayesian
persuasion problem with multiple receivers, and this aspect makes it significantly more complex.
There has been work on signaling in auctions that cannot be modeled as Bayesian persuasion,
i.e., in which the common signal is not generated by an intermediary who knows all the true values
of the buyers. For instance, in [4], the auctioneer has perfect information about buyer valuations
and controls the precision to which buyers can learn it, and in [13], the seller’s signal is drawn
from a distribution that is correlated with the buyer’s value, In both these works, the goal is
to maximize seller revenue. Finally [17] studies equilibria of optimal auctions when each buyer
commits to a signaling scheme with imperfect knowledge of other buyers’ valuations, while [2]
studies equilibria in first price auctions when buyers are provided correlated signals about other
buyers’ valuations. In contrast with the former, our work considers a richer space of signals via an
information intermediary, while compared to the latter, in our setting the seller’s mechanism is not
fixed, but is instead also a function of the information structure.
2 Preliminaries
We consider Bayesian single-item auctions with n buyers, with independent private valuations
~V = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn) drawn from a known product distribution D = D1×· · ·×Dn. Unless otherwise
stated, we present our results for the setting in which each Di is discrete. We denote by Ki the size
of the support of Di, and by K the size of the union of these supports.
For distribution Di, we use fDi to denote its probability mass function, and define SDi(x) =
PrV∼Di [V ≥ x] and FDi(x) = PrV∼Di [V ≤ x]. For a joint distribution D and vector ~v, we use
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Pr[D = ~v] = fD(~v) as shorthand for denoting the probability of ~v drawn from D.
2.1 Revenue-Maximizing Auctions
Given any shared prior D′ on the valuations of the buyers, which in the case of signaling, can be
different from D and arbitrarily correlated, the seller runs an optimal (revenue maximizing) auction
that satisfies ex-interim incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Using the revelation
principle [15], such an auction is specified by an allocation rule x∗(~v) ≥ 0 and a payment rule p∗(~v)
(that can be positive or negative) given any realized valuation profile ~v. The quantity x∗i (~v) is the
probability buyer i gets the item given the valuation profile ~v.
The incentive compatibility (IC) constraint states that the expected utility of any buyer does
not increase by misreporting its valuation. Formally, for every agent i, for every value q, and for
every valuation vector ~v = (q,~v−i) (where ~v−i denotes the valuations of the other buyers), and
every other possible report r, we have∑
~v−i
Pr[D′ = (q,~v−i)]
Pr[D′i = q]
· (q · xi(q,~v−i)− pi(q,~v−i))
≥
∑
~v−i
Pr[D′ = (q,~v−i)]
Pr[D′i = q]
· (q · xi(r,~v−i)− pi(r,~v−i)) , ∀i, q.
The individual rationality (IR) constraint says that for any buyer and any valuation, the expected
utility under the mechanism is non-negative:∑
~v−i
Pr[D′ = (q,~v−i)]
Pr[D′i = q]
· (q · xi(q,~v−i)− pi(q,~v−i)) ≥ 0, ∀i, q.
Finally, for any prior D′, let (R(D′),W(D′),CS(D′)) denote the expected revenue, welfare
(or total surplus) and consumer surplus under the revenue-maximizing auction. Then we have
CS(D′) =W(D′)−R(D′), and:
R(D′) = max
∑
~v
Pr[D′ = ~v] ·
∑
i
p∗i (~v) and W(D′) =
∑
~v
Pr[D′ = ~v] ·
∑
i
vix
∗
i (~v).
Our work builds on two special cases – independent valuations, and full surplus extraction.
Optimal auction for independent valuations. When D = D1 × . . .Dn is a product distri-
bution, the optimal auction has a simple form given by Myerson [15]. For distribution Di with
support z1 < z2 < · · · < zk, its virtual value function ϕDi is defined as:
ϕDi(zk) = zk and ϕDi(z`) = z` − (z`+1 − z`)
SDi(z`+1)
fDi(z`)
, ∀` < k. (1)
If buyer i is the only buyer in the system, the optimal auction sets a fixed price, and the buyer
buys the item when her valuation is at least this price. The reserve price of Di, denoted rDi is the
smallest value r in the support of Di that maximizes the corresponding revenue rSDi(r). It is easy
to check that ϕDi(rDi) ≥ 0.
Throughout this paper, for analytic simplicity, we assume the distributions Di are regular, so
that ϕDi(z) is a non-decreasing function of z. Therefore, for all v < rDi , we have ϕDi(v) < 0.
Our proofs can be extended without this restriction.1 For discrete regular distributions, Myerson’s
auction takes the form [12] in Algorithm 1. Note that this auction is also ex-post IC and IR.
1When the valuations are non-regular, we use the non-decreasing ironed virtual value function [15, 12] instead.
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Algorithm 1: Myerson’s Auction with prior D and valuations ~v.
1 Sort the buyers in decreasing order of qi = ϕDi(vi). Assume no two values are identical (can
be ensured by using a fixed tie-breaking rule).
2 Allocate to the bidder j with highest virtual value qj , provided qj ≥ 0.
3 Let m be the bidder with second highest virtual value, and let w = max(0, qm).
4 Charge j the smallest value z in the support of Dj such that ϕDj (z) > w.
Extracting full surplus as revenue. At the other extreme, a celebrated result of Cre´mer and
McLean [7] shows that for distributions D′ which are “sufficiently correlated”, the optimal auction
extracts full surplus (i.e., the revenue equals the maximum valuation in each valuation profile).
Formally, the result requires that for each agent, their conditional distribution over others’ values
given their own value is full rank; for our purposes, we require a restriction of their result to n = 2
buyers, each with two possible valuations.
Theorem 4 (Cre´mer-McLean [7]). For n = 2 buyers, where each buyer i has Ki = 2 and the joint
distribution over the valuations is D′, the seller can extract the entire social welfare (expected value
of the maximum of the buyer’s valuations) as her revenue when D′ is a correlated distribution.
2.2 Auctions with an Information Intermediary
We next formalize the model of an information intermediary illustrated in Fig. 1a. Since the
effect of the intermediary’s signal is captured by the resulting posterior distribution over valuations,
for ease of notation, we henceforth use “signal” to refer to a distribution S over valuations.
A signaling scheme Z = {γq,Sq}q∈[m] comprises a collection of signals (i.e., joint distributions
over valuations) S1,S2, . . . ,Sm and corresponding non-negative weights γ1, γ2, . . . , γm. The scheme
Z is feasible (or “Bayes plausible” [14]) if it satisfies∑q γq = 1 and∑q γqSq = D. The intermediary
commits to scheme Z before the auction, and it is known to the seller and all buyers.
The intermediary maps observed valuation profile ~v ∼ D to signal Sq with probability γq Pr[Sq=~v]Pr[D=~v] .
The seller uses Sq as the shared prior and runs an optimal auction on the buyers. Note that thoughD
is a product distribution, the {Sq} can be correlated. Abusing the notation introduced in Eq. (1),
we denote the revenue generated by signaling scheme Z as R(Z) = ∑q γqR(Sq), its consumer
surplus by CS(Z) = ∑q γqCS(Sq), and its welfare by W(Z) = ∑q γqW(Sq).
When D is a product distribution, the revenue from any signaling scheme must be at least the
optimal revenue of Myerson’s auction without signaling, R(D). To see this, we note that Myerson’s
auction on D is ex-post IC and IR. This means that this allocation and payment rule is still a
feasible (ex-interim IC and IR) mechanism conditioned on receiving any signal, completing the
argument. Therefore, the consumer surplus CS(Z) under any signaling scheme Z is bounded by
the difference of the maximum possible welfare W∗ = E~V∼D[maxi Vi] and the maximum revenue
without signaling R(D). We henceforth denote this bound as Opt, which is defined as follows:
Opt =W∗ −R(D).
We say that Z is a θ-approximation signaling scheme if CS(Z) ≥ Optθ . Our goal is to find the best
approximation factor θ via a signaling scheme whose computation time is polynomial in n and K.
In the rest of the paper, we omit the dependence on D when clear from context.
Optimal signaling for a single buyer. For n = 1 buyer, Bergemann et al. [1] present a
signaling scheme with consumer surplus exactly equal to Opt (i.e., implementing the point O
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in Fig. 1b. Their signaling scheme constructs distributions (signals) S1,S2, . . .Sm and assigns
weights γ1, γ2, . . . γm to them such that
∑
q γqSq = D.
Let prior D takes value vi with probability pi, where 0 < v1 < . . . < vk. Let ~p = (p1, p2, . . . , pk).
In each iteration `, the algorithm constructs an equal revenue distribution S` and subtracts it from
the prior D. This equal revenue distribution assigns positive probability pi` to vi if pi > 0 and
assigns pi` = 0 if pi = 0. In S`, the seller raises equal revenue by setting the price to be any of
the values vi with pi > 0. It is easy to see that the equal revenue condition specifies a unique
distribution S`. Note that since this signal is equal revenue, the seller sets the lowest value as price,
so that the item always sells and the consumer surplus is maximum possible.
Let ~p` be the probability vector of S`. We set the largest weight γ` such that ~p− γ` ~p` ≥ 0. We
update D by setting ~p to ~p−γ` ~p`, normalize it so that
∑
i pi = 1, and increase ` by one. We repeat
this till the support of D becomes empty. The {γ`,S`} specifies the signaling scheme.
We illustrate this procedure by an example below.
Example 1. Suppose the type space is {1, 2, 3} and D = 〈13 , 13 , 13〉 are the probabilities of these
types. The monopoly price is p = 2 with revenue R(D) = 43 , while the point A in Fig. 1b has
social welfare R(A) = W∗ = E[D] = 2. Suppose S1 = 〈12 , 16 , 13〉 with γ1 = 23 ; S2 = 〈0, 13 , 23〉 with
γ2 =
1
6 ; and S3 = 〈0, 1, 0〉 with γ3 = 16 . It is easy to check that the monopoly price for each signal
is the lowest price in its support so that the item always sells, and
∑
γiR(Si) = 43 . Therefore,∑
γiCS(Si) = 2− 43 = 23 = Opt, which corresponds to point O in Fig. 1b.
We henceforth use BBM(v,D) to refer to this scheme when the buyer has valuation distribution
D and the realized value is v ∼ D. Below we state some critical properties of the BBM scheme
which we use in our results.
Lemma 1 (Implicit in Bergemann et al. [1]). For a single buyer with value distribution D (with
reserve price rD), the BBM mechanism satisfies the following properties:
1. For any signal Sq, ϕSq(v) ≥ 0 for all v in the support of Sq.
2. CS(BBM) = Opt ≥ PrV∼D[V < rD] ·EV∼D[V | V < rD] =
∑
v<rD vfD(v).
3 Lower Bound Instances
Our lower bounds in Theorems 1 and 2 are based on a 2-buyer instance illustrated in Fig. 2:
given values a > b > c > d, buyer 1 has value V1 ∈ {a, b} with probabilities α and 1−α respectively,
while buyer 2 has value V2 ∈ {c, d} with probabilities β and 1− β respectively. We choose αa = b
and βc = d; thus, the virtual values satisfy: ϕ1(a) = a, ϕ2(c) = c, and ϕ1(b) = ϕ2(d) = 0. We call
this distribution D.
Characterization of optimal signaling. By Theorem 4, we know any signal that correlates the
buyers raises zero consumer surplus. Therefore, the only signals S of interest are those under which
buyer values are independent. Abusing notation we denote such a signal as s = (α′, β′), where
Pr[v1 = a] = α
′ and Pr[v2 = c] = β′. Note that in this instance, for a signal to get maximum
welfare the resulting optimal mechanism must always award buyer 1, and for non-zero consumer
surplus it must award the item to buyer 1 at price b, or buyer 2 at price d.
Let CS(s) denote the consumer surplus under any such a signal s, and ϕ1(b|s) and ϕ2(d|s)
denote the new virtual values (note that by definition, ϕ1(a|s) = a and ϕ2(c|s) = c under any
signal s with α′, β′ > 0). We can use Myerson’s characterization (Section 2.1) to exhaustively
characterize the resulting optimal mechanisms as a function of (ϕ1(b|s), ϕ2(d|s)):
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Figure 2: Illustrating the setting for Theorems 1 and 2: On the left (below the axis) we show the setting
without signaling, where buyer 1 (blue) has values (a, b) and buyer 2 (red) has values (c, d); we also show
the corresponding virtual values (above the axis). On the right, we show the two settings characterized by
Theorem 5 under which a signal s has non-zero consumer surplus (the changed virtual values are highlighted).
Proposition 1. Conditioned on receiving a signal s, we have the following cases:
1. If ϕ1(b) ≥ c, then the optimal mechanism is to sell to Buyer 1 at price b. CS(s) = (a− b)α′.
2. If ϕ2(d) ≥ max(0, ϕ1(b)), then the optimal mechanism is to try selling to Buyer 1 at price a
then to Buyer 2 at price d. CS(s) = (1− α′)β′(c− d).
3. If ϕ1(b) ≤ 0 and ϕ2(d) ≤ 0, then the optimal mechanism is to try selling to Buyer 1 at price
a then to Buyer 2 at price c. CS(s) = 0.
4. If 0 ≤ ϕ1(b) ≤ c and ϕ2(d) ≤ ϕ1(b), then the optimal mechanism is to sell to Buyer 1 at price
b if Buyer 2 has valuation d; otherwise, it tries selling to Buyer 1 at price a then to Buyer 2
at price c. CS(s) = α′(1− β′)(a− b).
Our main insight, however, is that the setting can be further simplified to get the following
structural property for the optimal signaling scheme.
Theorem 5 (Structural Theorem). In an optimal signaling scheme, the only signals s = (α′, β′)
that raise non-zero consumer surplus have the following form:
(1’) Under signal s, ϕ1(b|s) = ϕ2(c|s) = c and CS(s) = α′(a− b).
(2’) Under signal s, ϕ2(d|s) = ϕ1(b|s) ≥ 0 and CS(s) = α′(1− β′)(a− b).
Proof. Recall that we restrict ourselves to signals S under which the buyer valuations remain
independent. Any such signal can be alternately written as s = (α′, β′) where α′ = Pr[v1 = a] and
β′ = Pr[v2 = c]. For ease of notation, we henceforth drop the conditioning of virtual valuations on
signal s (i.e., write ϕ(·) for ϕ(·|s)) when clear from context.
Next, let γs denote the weight of any signal s = (α
′, β′). The signaling scheme that maximizes
consumer surplus is the solution to the following linear program written over signals s = (α′, β′):
Maximize
∑
s
γsCS(s)
Subject to
∑
s=(α′,β′) γsα
′β′ ≤ αβ∑
s=(α′,β′) γsα
′(1− β′) ≤ α(1− β)∑
s=(α′,β′) γs(1− α′)β′ ≤ (1− α)β∑
s=(α′,β′) γs(1− α′)(1− β′) ≤ (1− α)(1− β)
γs ≥ 0 ∀s
(2)
We examine the cases in Proposition 1 with positive consumer surplus, and characterize the
optimal solution:
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• In Case (1), we have ϕ1(b) = c. To see this, consider any signal s with ϕ1(b) > c. Suppose we
increase α′ and decrease γs while preserving the product α′γs. Since γsCS(s) = γsα′(a− b),
this is preserved by the change. Therefore, the objective of LP (2) is preserved, and so are the
first two constraints. Further, since (1− α′) decreases, this only makes the third and fourth
constraints more feasible. This transformation decreases ϕ1(b).
• In Case (2) and (4), we have ϕ2(d) = ϕ1(b). It does not help to make them unequal by a similar
argument as above: In case (2), if ϕ2(d) > ϕ1(b), we can increase β
′ while preserving γsβ′.
Since γsCS(s) = γs(1 − α′)β′(c − d), this does not change the contribution to the objective
of LP (2), and preserves all constraints. This transformation decreases ϕ2(d) In case (4), if
ϕ2(d) < ϕ1(b), we can increase α
′ while preserving γsα′. Since γsCS(s) = γsα′(1−β′)(a− b),
this does not change the contribution to the objective of LP (2), and preserves all constraints.
This transformation decreases ϕ1(b)
Therefore, the only two types of signals s that give positive CS are
(1’) If ϕ1(b) = c, then CS(s) = α
′(a− b).
(2’) If ϕ2(d) = ϕ1(b) ≥ 0, then CS(s) = max((1− α′)β′(c− d), α′(1− β′)(a− b)).
As (1− β′)(b− d) ≥ 0, we have(
b− d+ β
′
1− β′ (c− d)
)
(1− β′) ≥ β′(c− d).
Notice that in Case (2’), we have ϕ1(b) = b− α′1−α′ (a− b) = d− β
′
1−β′ (c− d) = ϕ2(d). This gives
α′(1− β′)(a− b) ≥ (1− α′)β′(c− d).
Thus, the two types of signals s that give positive CS become
(1’) If ϕ1(b) = c, then CS(s) = α
′(a− b).
(2’) If ϕ2(d) = ϕ1(b) ≥ 0, then CS(s) = α′(1− β′)(a− b).
Using the above structural theorem, the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 follow by different choices
of the parameters (a, b, c, d). For Theorem 1, we set d =
(
1− ε2
)
b, with ϕ1(b) and ϕ2(d) slightly
above zero; for Theorem 2, we set α = β = 1−δ; a = 1
(1−δ)2 , b =
1
1−δ , c = 1, d = 1−δ with δ → 0+.
Proof of Theorem 1. In the instance presented in the beginning of Section 3, suppose the virtual
values of b and d are slightly above zero with ϕ1(b) > ϕ2(d) so that Case (4) in Proposition 1
is uniquely optimal for the seller. The optimal auction generates consumer surplus CS(D) =
α(1− β)(a− b) = bc · c−da · (a− b) according to Proposition 1.
To prove Theorem 1, we set b→ c+.2 Now in Proposition 1, in Case (1), we must have α′ → 0+
since b→ c+, so that CS→ 0. Also if α′ = 1 in a signal then CS = 0 here. The only other signal
where the item is allocated to the higher bidder is in Case (4) when β′ = 0. Let γ denote the
probability of the signal of this type s = (α′, 0). (Having multiple signals of this form gives the
same CS as having a single signal as their average.) Since ϕ1(b) ≥ ϕ2(d), we have α′ ≤ b−da−d .
2ϕ1(b)− ϕ2(d) and ϕ2(d) can be arbitrarily small as long as positive, so we take the limits for them first, i.e., we
are calculating limb→c+ limϕ2(d)→0+,ϕ1(b)→ϕ2(d)+ CS in the following part of the proof. This allows us to treat α =
b
a
and β = d
c
in calculating (1− α)(1− β), as α and β are not infinitesimally close to 1 for any fixed ε.
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By the constraints of LP (2), we have:
Pr[v1 = b ∧ v2 = d] = γ(1− α′) ≤ (1− α)(1− β),
which simplifies to γ ≤ (a−d)·(c−d)ac . The consumer surplus in this case is therefore:
CS = γCS(s) = γα′(a− b) ≤ (b− d) · (c− d)
ac
· (a− b) ≤ b− d
b
·CS(D).
Setting d =
(
1− ε2
)
b and combining with the fact that CS→ 0 in Case (1), we have the consumer
surplus of any efficient signaling, CS→ ε2 ·CS(D) so CS < ε ·CS(D).
Proof of Theorem 2. Without signaling, E[max vi] = αa + (1 − α)b and R(D) = αa + (1 − α)βc.
(Case (2), (3) and (4) in Proposition 1 give the same revenue R(D).) Therefore
Opt = E[max vi]−R(D) = (1− α)(b− βc).
Now we assign the values as: α = β = 1− δ; a = 1
(1−δ)2 , b =
1
1−δ , c = 1, d = 1− δ with δ → 0+.
Then we plug in the values and the two possible types of signals s in Theorem 5 become
(1’) If α′ = 1−δ2−δ <
1
2 , then CS(s) ≤ 12δ(1 + o(1)).
(2’) If α′ ≤ 1− δ; β′ = 1−3(1−α′)+3δ(1−α′)−δ2(1−α′)1−2(1−α′)+δ(1−α′) > 1−3(1−α
′)
1−2(1−α′) , then CS(s) ≤ α′(1−β′)δ(1 +o(1)).
The consumer surplus maximizing signaling scheme should use t signals S2,i of type (2’), with
α′2,i, β
′
2,i and weight w(S2,i). There is an additional signal S1 (with weight w(S1)) of type (1’) with
α′1 and β′1. (Having multiple signals of type (1’) gives the same CS as having a single signal as
their average.) Denoting the valuation of the first buyer by v1 and the second buyer by v2, the
constraints in LP (2) imply the two constraints:
Pr[v1 = b] = (1− α′1)w(S1) +
t∑
i=1
(1− α′2,i) · w(S2,i) ≤ 1− α = δ, (Constraint (I))
Pr[v1 = b ∧ v2 = d] =
t∑
i=1
(1− α′2,i)(1− β′2,i) · w(S2,i) ≤ (1− α)(1− β) = δ2. (Constraint (II))
Note that Opt = (1− α)(b− βc) = 2δ2(1 + o(1)).
The total consumer surplus therefore is:
CS ≤1
2
δ(1 + o(1)) · w(S1) +
t∑
i=1
α′2,i(1− β′2,i)δ(1 + o(1)) · w(S2,i)
≤1
2
δ(1 + o(1)) · 2
(
δ −
t∑
i=1
(1− α′2,i) · w(S2,i)
)
+ δ(1 + o(1))
t∑
i=1
α′2,i(1− β′2,i) · w(S2,i)
=δ2(1 + o(1)) + δ(1 + o(1))
t∑
i=1
(α′2,i(1− β′2,i)− (1− α′2,i)) · w(S2,i)
≤δ2(1 + o(1)) + δ(1 + o(1))
t∑
i=1
(1− α′2,i)(1− β′2,i) · w(S2,i)
≤δ2(1 + o(1)) + δ(1 + o(1)) · δ2
=δ2(1 + o(1)).
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Here the second inequality follows from Constraint (I), and α′1 <
1
2 . The third inequality uses the
implication of ϕ2(d) = ϕ1(b) that β
′
2,i >
1−3(1−α′2,i)
1−2(1−α′2,i) . The fourth inequality uses Constraint (II).
This establishes a lower bound of 2, since Opt = 2δ2(1 + o(1)).
4 Ranking-Based Multi-Buyer Signaling Scheme
In this section, we introduce a family of signaling schemes, which forms the basic subroutine
for obtaining our upper bounds. We first need one additional definition. For agent i with Vi ∼ Di,
we use Di|>a to denote the conditional distribution of Vi given Vi > a, and Di|<a to denote the
conditional distribution of Vi given Vi < a. Moreover, we use Di|>a − b to denote the distribution
of Vi − b given Vi > a; we refer to it as the distribution of Vi truncated at a and reduced by b. We
now state a simple result relating the reserve price of the truncated and the original distributions.
Lemma 2. Let D′i = Di|>v◦ − v◦. Then we have rD′i ≥ rDi − v◦, and moreover, for any v > v◦, we
have ϕD′i(v − v◦) = ϕDi(v)− v◦.
Proof. We first prove the result about reserve prices. Let r = rDi and r′ = rD′i . If r ≤ v◦ the
inequality is trivial. Otherwise, suppose for contradiction that for some r′ < r − v◦, r′ · SD′i(r′) ≥
(r−v◦)·SD′i(r−v◦). Then we would have: (r′+v◦)·SD′i(r′) ≥ r·SD′i(r−v◦), since SD′i(r′) ≥ SD′i(r−v◦).
Thus, (r′ + v◦) · SDi(r′ + v◦) ≥ r · SDi(r), a contradiction to the assumption that r is the smallest
optimal reserve price of Di.
To see the second part, if we condition the distribution on v > v◦, this does not change the
virtual value function for values vj > v
◦, since both the numerator and denominator in Eq. (1)
scale by the same amount. If we now subtract v◦ from the support of the distribution, it reduces
the virtual value by the same amount. This completes the proof.
Note that D′i = Di|>v◦ − v◦ represents buyer i’s excess value compared to v◦. Lemma 2 shows
that for any threshold v◦ and any buyer i, given the side-information that Vi > v◦, her new reserve
price is greater than her original reserve price.
The Rankt signaling scheme. We now introduce a family of signaling schemes Rankt param-
eterized by t ∈ {1, . . . n}, For any realized joint valuation profile ~v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn), the signal sent
by Rankt consists of two parts. First, Rankt observes ~v and outputs (v
◦, T ), where v◦ is the value
of (t+1)st largest realized value (or 0 when t = n), and T is the subset of buyers with realized value
strictly greater than v◦. For the second part of the signal, Rankt chooses a buyer j uniformly at
random from T , and computes her excess distribution Dj|>v◦−v◦. It then reveals both the identity
of j, as well as the signal BBM(vj − v◦,Dj|>v◦ − v◦) generated by the single-buyer BBM scheme
on a buyer with value distribution Dj|>v◦ − v◦. The scheme is formalized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Rankt(~v,D)
1 v◦ ← (t+ 1)st largest value in ~v
2 T ← {i : vi > v◦}
3 if T 6= ∅ then
4 j ← Buyer chosen uniformly
at random from T
5 s← BBM(vj−v◦,Dj|>v◦−v◦)
6 return v◦, T , j, and s
7 else
8 return v◦, and T = ∅
Optimal mechanism under Rankt. Conditioned on
receiving the signal generated by Rankt, the seller is
guaranteed a revenue of v◦ from the (t+1)st largest buyer,
and knows that only buyers in T can pay more than v◦.
The seller can now charge at least v◦ to any buyer in T ,
and can further run an auction over the excess value of
buyers in T , where for buyer i ∈ T , her excess value has
distribution D′i = Di|>v◦ − v◦. Note that for any buyer
i ∈ T except the randomly chosen buyer j, a value drawn
from D′i represents how much more than v◦ she is willing
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to pay. Moreover, distributions D′i are independent, and
also, since the identity of j is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom, the BBM scheme modifies the distribution of buyer
j in a fashion that is independent of D′i.
By Lemma 1, we know that the BBM scheme ensures
the virtual value of buyer j is always non-negative. From the characterization of the optimal
auction [15, 12], since the item is always allocated to the highest virtual value bidder as long as this
value is non-negative, the item will always be allocated to buyer j if all other buyers i ∈ T, i 6= j
have excess values vi − v◦ < rD′i (and hence, negative virtual values).
Consumer surplus under Rankt. Let pi := 1− SDi(rDi) = Prvi∼Di [vi < rDi ] for any buyer i,
where rDi is the reserve price of Di. Let Yi := Di|<rDi denote the distribution of Di conditioned on
being smaller than rDi . Suppose we draw a sample independently from each distribution Yi. Let
Z` denote the distribution for the `
th largest value among these n draws. The following key lemma
gives a lower bound for the consumer surplus generated under Rankt.
Lemma 3. For 1 ≤ t ≤ n, the consumer surplus of Rankt satisfies:
CS(Rankt) ≥
(
n∏
i=1
pi
)
·
((
1
t
·
t∑
`=1
E[Z`]
)
−E[Zt+1]
)
.
Proof. Fix a buyer b, and any valuation profile ~v−b = {vi, i 6= b} such that vi < rDi ∀ i 6= b. Define
vtb to denote the t
th largest value in {vi, i 6= b}. Now consider the event
Q(~v−b, b, t) = {Vb > vtb AND b selected for BBM signaling}.
Conditioned on Q(~v−b, b, t), we have that the Rankt scheme (Algorithm 2) with parameter t sets
threshold value as v◦ = vtb. By Lemma 2, we have that for every i ∈ T, i 6= b, their value vi is
smaller than their new reserve price v◦+ rD′i , since vi < rDi , and modifying Di to D′i = Di|>v◦ − v◦
does not decrease the reserve price. Therefore, conditioned on Q(~v−b, b, t), the auction behaves like
the single item mechanism BBM(v′b,D′b), where v′b = vb − vtb, D′b = Db|>vtb − vtb. Let r′b denote the
reserve price of D′b; again using Lemma 2 we have r′b ≥ rb − vtb. Now, using Lemma 1, we get that
the expected consumer surplus generated by Rankt under Q(~v−b, b, t) is at least:
E[CS(Rankt) | Q(~v−b, b, t)] ≥
∑
v′b<r
′
b
v′bPr[D′b = v′b] ≥
∑
vtb<vb<rb
(vb − vtb)
fDb(vb)
SDb(vtb)
.
Note also that Pr[Q(~v−b, b, t)] = 1t ·
(∏
i 6=b fDi(vi)1{vi<rDi}
)
· SDb(vtb). Thus for any buyer b,
and any valuation profile ~v−b with vi < ri for all i 6= b, we have
E[CS(Rankt) · 1Q(~v−b,b,t)] = Pr[Q(~v−b, b, t)] ·E[CS(Rankt) | Q(~v−b, b, t)]
≥ 1
t
∏
i 6=b
fDi(vi)
 ∑
vtb<vb<rb
(vb − vtb)fDb(vb)
=
1
t
∑
vb<rb
(∏
i
fDi(vi)
)
max{(vb − vtb), 0}.
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For any ~v let v(t) denote the tth largest value, and It(~v) to be the indices corresponding to the top
t values in ~v. Summing up over all b, and all ~v−b such that vi < ri ∀ i 6= b, we have∑
b
∑
~v−b
E[CS(Rankt) · 1Q(~v−b,b,t)] ≥
∑
~v|vi<ri
1
t
·
(∏
i
fDi(vi)
)
·
(∑
b
max{(vb − vtb), 0}
)
=
∑
~v|vi<ri
(∏
i
fDi(vi)
) ∑
i∈It(~v)
1
t
(
vi − v(t+1)
)
=
∑
~v|vi<ri
(∏
i
fDi(vi)
) ∑
i∈It(~v)
vi
t
− v(t+1)
 . (3)
Let D′i = Di|<rDi be the distribution of buyer i’s value conditioned on Vi < rDi . Recall we define
pi = Prvi∼Di [vi < rDi ]; thus fD′i(v) = fDi(v)/pi. Suppose we independently sample Yi ∼ Di|<rDi
for each i, and define Z` as the `
th largest value in {Yi}. Then Eq. (3) can be written as
∑
b
∑
~v−b|vi<ri ∀ i 6=b
E[CS(Rankt) · 1Q(~v−b,b,t)] ≥
∑
~v|vi<ri
(∏
i
pi
)
fD′(~v)
 ∑
i∈It(~v)
vi
t
− v(t+1)

=
(∏
i
pi
)((
t∑
`=1
E[Z`]
t
)
−E[Zt+1]
)
.
Finally, noting that the Q(~v−b, b, t) events are all non-overlapping, we can write
CS(Rankt) ≥
∑
b
∑
~v−b|vi<ri ∀ i 6=b
E[CS(Rankt) · 1Q(~v−b,b,t)],
thereby completing the proof.
Lemma 3 forms the crux of our subsequent analysis, helping us quantify how our selective BBM
signal recovers much of the surplus lost by the Myerson auction. The difficulty in proving it arises
from the correlation between the probability the chosen buyer j wins the auction, and the surplus
raised by the BBM scheme, and we get around it by coupling the surplus generated when buyer
values are above the reserve with the order statistics of buyer valuations below the reserve.
5 Approximating Consumer Surplus: Proof of Theorem 3
We now prove our main theorem. For this, we first decompose our benchmark consumer surplus
Opt, and then use Lemma 3 to quantify how we recover each term via signaling. Recall we start with
a product distribution D = D1×D2×· · ·×Dn, where Di has reserve price ri. Let x1 < x2 < . . . < xK
be the union of the supports of value distributions. R(D) denotes the revenue of the optimal auction
on D, and Opt = E~v∼D[maxi vi]−R(D). We can now decompose Opt into three components:
Myerson’s surplus. The consumer surplus generated by Myerson’s auction, denoted by CS(D).
Non-allocation surplus. The loss in consumer surplus due to Myerson’s auction not allocating
the item, denoted by CS0. In Lemma 4 (Section 5.1), we show that
CS0 =
∏
i
Pr
vi∼Di
[vi < ri] · E
~v∼D
[
max
i
vi
∣∣∣∣ vi < ri ∀i] .
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Mis-allocation surplus. The loss in surplus because the highest value and highest virtual-value
buyers are different. We denote the expected loss due to mis-allocating the item to buyer i as CSi,
and the expected loss due to mis-allocating to a buyer with value xk as ĈSk.
For i.i.d. values, we can write Opt = CS(D) + CS0, since the highest virtual-value and highest
value buyers coincide. For non-i.i.d. settings, we have two ways of decomposing Opt:
Opt = CS(D) + CS0 +
n∑
i=1
CSi and Opt = CS(D) + CS0 +
K∑
k=1
ĈSk. (4)
In the remainder, when seeking a θ-approximation to Opt, we assume CS(D) is not already a θ-
approximation. We first present an O(min(log n,K))-approximation for the non-allocation surplus
CS0, and then use it to approximate the remaining terms CSi and ĈSk in the above expressions.
5.1 Approximating the Non-allocation Surplus
Algorithm 3: S0(~v,D)
1 Choose
t = argmaxnt′=1CS(Rankt′).
2 return Rankt(~v,D)
The scheme we use to approximate CS0 is simple: We
choose the parameter t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} that maximizes
CS(Rankt) and run Rankt. This choice of t only de-
pends on the distribution D. Formally, we denote this
scheme as S0(~v,D), and present it in Algorithm 3. The
following theorem is our main technical contribution:
Theorem 6. The consumer surplus of the signaling
scheme S0(~v,D) is an O
(
min(log n,K))-approximation to the non-allocation surplus, CS0.
The proof of the O(log n)-approximation involves analyzing an appropriate randomization of
Rankt over different t (Algorithm 4), while the proof of the O(K)-approximation involves showing
a stronger version of Markov’s inequality for independent Bernoulli random variables (Lemma 6),
which may be of independent interest.
Identically distributed buyers. For i.i.d. values, we use the better of two schemes: Using
S0(~v,D) or sending no signal. This immediately implies an O
(
min(log n,K))-approximation to
Opt, as in this setting we have: Opt = CS(D) + CS0. This completes the first part of Theorem 3.
5.1.1 O(log n)-Approximation of CS0
To prove Theorem 6, we first derive an expression for CS0. We denote a realization from D by
~v = {vi}. Let pi, ri, Yi, Zt be as defined in Section 4. We have the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Let P =
∏n
i=1 pi. Then, CS0 = P ·E[Z1].
Proof. Note that CS0 is the expected surplus lost due to not allocating the item in Myerson’s
mechanism. This happens only when all realized values are below their corresponding reserve
price. In this case, the value lost is the maximum valuation, since this value contributes to the
welfare, and the revenue raised is zero. Therefore, we have:
CS0 =
(
n∏
i=1
pi
)
·E
[
max
i=1,2,...,n
vi
∣∣∣∣ ∀i, vi < ri]
where the expectation is over ~v ∼ D. This is equal to P ·E[Z1].
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We first show CS(S0) is an O(log n)-approximation to CS0. We construct a signaling scheme
denoted by S20 such that CS(S20 ) ≤ CS(S0). We will then prove that consumer surplus of S20 is an
O(log n)-approximation to CS0.
This scheme can be constructed by randomizing over different values for parameter t in Rankt.
We assign a weight wj to each rank j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and pick a rank t with probability proportional
to these weights. Note that this choice of the rank t does not depend on ~v. Subsequently, we run
Rankt. Formally, the signaling scheme is as follows.
Algorithm 4: S20 (~v,D)
1 wj ← 1j+1 for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 2}
2 wn−1 ← 1; wn ← 1
3 Choose rank t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} where rank j is chosen with probability proportional to wj .
4 return Rankt(~v,D)
Lemma 5. The consumer surplus of S20 is an O(log n)-approximation to CS0.
Proof. We have:
CS(S20 ) =
∑n
t=1wt ·CS(Rankt)∑n
t=1wt
.
Recall the definition of P from Lemma 4. We now use Lemma 3 to lower bound the numerator of
the above formula:
n−1∑
t=1
wtCS(Rankt) + wnCS(Rankn)
≥P
n−2∑
t=1
E[Zt] ·
n−2∑
j=t
1
j(j + 1)
−(n−1∑
t=2
E[Zt] · 1
t
)
+
(
n−1∑
t=1
E[Zt] · 1
n− 1
)
−E[Zn]
+ CS(Rankn)
=P · (E[Z1]−E[Zn]) + CS(Rankn).
It is easy to see that CS(Rankn) ≥ P ·E[Zn]. Using Lemma 4, we have:
n∑
i=1
wiCS(Ranki) ≥ P ·E[Z1] = CS0.
Now, we compute the denominator:
n∑
t=1
wt = 1 +
n−1∑
t=1
1
t
≤ 1 + lnn.
Therefore, we have:
CS(S20 ) =
∑n
t=1wt ·CS(Rankt)∑n
t=1wt
≥ CS0
1 + lnn
.
Since the scheme S0 chooses the Rankt with largest value, we now have the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Consumer surplus of S0 is an O(log n)-approximation to CS0.
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5.1.2 O(K)-Approximation of CS0
For proving this part, we will assume n > 5. For smaller values of n, the analysis in the previous
section already yields a constant-approximation to CS0. Using Lemma 4, we know CS0 = P ·E[Z1].
Setting x0 = 0, we therefore have:
E[Z1] =
K∑
k=1
Pr[Z1 ≥ xk] · (xk − xk−1).
Therefore, there is a k∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} such that E[Z1] ≤ K ·Pr[Z1 ≥ xk∗ ] · (xk∗ − xk∗−1). We
fix this k∗, and deduce:
CS0 ≤ K · P ·Pr[Z1 ≥ xk∗ ] · (xk∗ − xk∗−1).
Therefore, if we show that CS(S0) ≥ Ω(1) · P · Pr[Z1 ≥ x∗k] · (x∗k − xk∗−1), then we have an
O(K)-approximation to CS0.
In order to show the former statement, we need the following probability lemma:
Lemma 6. Given n independent Bernoulli random variables, Xi ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, let
N =
∑
iXi. Then there exists a value j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that:
min
(
1,
E[N ]
j
)
−Pr[N ≥ j + 1] ≥ Pr[N ≥ 1]
5
.
Proof. Let αq be the probability that N = q. At least one of the following holds:
• If E[N ] < 5, then for j = 5, we have:
min
(
1,
E[N ]
5
)
−Pr[N ≥ 6] = 1
5
E[N ]−Pr[N ≥ 6]
≥ 1
5
 n∑
q=1
qαq
− α6 ≥ 1
5
·
 n∑
q=1
αq
 = Pr[N ≥ 1]
5
.
• If 5 ≤ E[N ] ≤ n3 , then we set j = 2 · dE[N ]e. It is easy to see that for this setting, we have
min
(
1, E[N ]j
)
≥ 0.4. By a standard application of Chernoff bounds we have:
Pr[N ≥ j + 1] < e− 53 < 0.19.
Therefore we have:
min
(
1,
E[N ]
j
)
−Pr[N ≥ j + 1] ≥ 0.2 ≥ Pr[N ≥ 1]
5
.
• If E[N ] ≥ n3 , then we set j = n, so that
min
(
1,
E[N ]
n
)
−Pr[N ≥ n+ 1] ≥ 1
3
≥ Pr[N ≥ 1]
5
.
We now complete the proof of the O(K)-approximation in the lemma below.
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Lemma 7. There exists a value t′ such that CS(Rankt′) ≥ Ω(1) ·P ·Pr[Z1 ≥ xk∗ ] · (xk∗ − xk∗−1).
Proof. Recall that Yi is the distribution of Di conditioned on being strictly below the reserve price
ri. We draw one random variable independently from each Yi. We define Gk to be the random
variable corresponds to the number of draws with value at least xk∗ among those n draws. Using
Lemma 3, we have:
CS(Rankt) ≥ P ·E
[∑t
i=1 Zi
t
− Zt+1
]
≥ P · (xk∗ − xk∗−1) ·
(
min
(
1,
E[Gk∗ ]
t
)
−Pr[Gk∗ ≥ t+ 1]
)
.
We define a Bernoulli random variable Xi that is 1 when Yi ≥ xk∗ and zero otherwise. Applying
Lemma 6, there exists a value of t′ between 1 and n such that the following holds:(
min
(
1,
E[G∗k]
t′
)
−Pr[G∗k ≥ t′ + 1]
)
= Ω(1) ·Pr[G∗k ≥ 1] = Ω(1) ·Pr[Z1 ≥ xk∗ ].
This when combined with the previous inequality, completes the proof.
According to the previous lemma, there is a t′ such that consumer surplus of Rankt′ is an O(K)-
approximation and CS(S0) ≥ CS(Rankt′) for any t′. Therefore, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Consumer surplus of S0 is an O(K)-approximation to CS0.
Combining Corollaries 1 and 2 completes the proof of Theorem 6.
5.2 Approximating the Mis-allocation Surplus
Finally, we prove Theorem 3 when Di are not all identical. From Eq. (4), this requires approx-
imating CSi and ĈSk for any i and k. Recall CSi is the surplus lost when a non highest-value
bidder i wins the auction. Assuming we break ties in favor of the higher valued buyer, we have:
CSi =
∑
~v:i=argmaxj(ϕDj (vj))
Pr[D = ~v] ·
(
max
j
(vj)− vi
)
. (5)
Similarly, ĈSk is the surplus lost when the item is allocated to a buyer with value xk. Again
assuming ties are broken in favor of higher-valued buyers, we have:
ĈSk =
∑
~v:xk=maxj(ϕDj (vj))
Pr[D = ~v] ·
(
max
j
(vj)− xk
)
. (6)
To approximate these quantities, we run the signaling scheme for approximating CS0 on a
modified product distribution. In this new scheme, we fix a cut-off value c, and reveal the identity
of all the buyers with realized value strictly greater than c. Let a denote the largest realized value
that is at most c, and T denote the set of buyers with values strictly bigger than a. We first modify
the distribution Di for i ∈ T as follows: Recall that Di|>c denotes the distribution of Vi conditioned
on Vi > c; let Xi denote the corresponding random variable. We change the distribution to be that
of Xi − a, that we denote Dj|>c − a. We now subtract a from all the valuations vi, i ∈ T , and run
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the signaling scheme S0 in this instance. The details of the scheme can be found in Algorithm 5,
where c is the cutoff parameter, and where we denote by ~vT the |T | dimensional vector made by
choosing the indices in T from ~v. Note that c could be different from a when there is no buyer
whose value coincides with c.
Algorithm 5: Trunc(~v,D, c)
1 a← maxvi≤c(vi); and T ← {j : vj > a}
2 DT,a ←
∏
j∈Ti(Dj|>c − a) // Modified distributions for j ∈ T.
3 ~v′ ← ~vT − a // a is a vector with all elements equal to a.
4 s← S0(~v′,DT,a) // s is the signal returned by S0.
5 return (a, Ti, s) as final signal
Approximating Opt for small n. We choose i∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} that maximizes CSi. By Eq. (4),
to get an O(n log n)-approximation to Opt, it suffices to demonstrate an O(log n)-approximation to
CSi∗ . The scheme S1 chooses i∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . n} that maximizes CSi and returns Trunc(~v,D, vi∗).
Theorem 7. The consumer surplus of S1 is an O(log n)-approximation to CSi∗.
Proof. Recall that the final scheme S1 chooses i∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . n} that maximizes CSi as defined in
Eq. (5) and returns Trunc(~v,D, vi∗) as defined in Algorithm 5. Applying Corollary 1 from Sec-
tion 5.1 to the modified distribution DT,a defined in Algorithm 5, the consumer surplus of S1 is at
least:
1
lnn+ 1
∑
T,a
Pr(T, a)CS0(DT,a)
where Pr(T, a) is the probability of the event that vi∗ = a and the set of all the buyers with value
strictly larger than a is T .
In order to prove the lemma, we need to show the following:
CSi∗ ≤
∑
T,a
Pr(T, a)CS0(DT,a).
From Eq. (5), we have:
CSi∗ =
∑
~v:i∗=argmaxj(ϕDj (vj))
Pr[D = ~v] ·
(
max
j
(vj)− vi∗
)
.
Let D′j = Dj|>a − a and let its reserve price be r′j . Then,
Pr(T, a)CS0(DT,a) =
∑
~v′:v′j<r
′
j∀j∈T
Pr(T, a) ·Pr[DT,a = ~v′] ·max
j∈T
(v′j).
Note that for every vector ~v ∈ D there is a corresponding set T , value a, and vector ~v′ ∈ DT,a as
defined in Algorithm 5. We show that if a positive value is added to CSi∗ in the above formula, at
least the same amount will be added to the corresponding Pr(T, a)CS0(DT,a) by the corresponding
vector v′. First, since DT,a is the product of conditional distributions of values of buyers in T being
larger than a, we have:
Pr[D = ~v] = Pr(T, a) ·Pr[DT,a = ~v′].
18
Now, there is a positive contribution to CSi∗ in the event where vj = maxi vi and ϕDj (vj) <
ϕDi∗ (vi∗) ≤ vi∗ = a. This assumes ties are broken by allocating to the buyer with higher valuation.
The contribution to CSi∗ is vj − vi∗ .
Consider the distribution Dj . By Lemma 2, ϕD′j (vj−a) = ϕDj (vj). Since ϕDj (vj) < a = vi∗ , we
have ϕD′j (v
′
j) < 0 so that v
′
j < r
′
j . Therefore, the contribution to CS0(DT,a) is precisely v′j = vj−vi∗ .
This completes the proof.
Since there are n possible choices of i∗, this directly implies:
Corollary 3. Any n-dimensional product distribution D admits O(n log n)-approximate signaling.
Approximating Opt for small K. Similar to the previous section, consider k∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}
that maximizes ĈSk. The scheme, denoted by S2 executes Trunc(~v,D, xk∗). Note that there may
be no bidder with valuation xk∗ , which motivates the way Algorithm 5 is presented.
Theorem 8. The consumer surplus of S2 is an O(K)-approximation to ĈSk∗.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7 and we omit details. First, by applying
Corollary 2 from Section 5.1 to the modified distribution DT,xk∗ , the consumer surplus of S2 defined
in Section 5.2 is at least:
Ω
(
1
K
)∑
T
Pr(T )CS0(DT,xk∗ )
where Pr(T ) is the probability that the set of all the buyers with value strictly larger than xk∗ is
T . Furthermore using Eq. (6) and by replacing vi∗ by xk∗ in the proof in Theorem 7, we have
ĈSk∗ ≤
∑
T
Pr(T )CS0(DT,xk∗ ).
Combining the above two bounds proves the theorem.
Since there are K possible values of k∗, the previous theorem directly implies:
Corollary 4. Any n-dimensional product distribution D admits O(K2)-approximate signaling.
Combining Corollaries 3 and 4 completes the proof of Theorem 3 for the non-i.i.d. case.
6 Conclusion
The immediate and challenging open questions involve tightening our bounds. First, we do not
have any lower bound for the i.i.d. case, since the bounds in Theorems 1 and 2 both require non-
i.i.d. distributions. Indeed, for two-valued i.i.d. distributions, the upper bound on approximation
ratio is also one. Improving our lower bounds will require a better characterization of the consumer
surplus generated by signals that correlate buyer valuations, beyond the Cre´mer-McLean charac-
terization [7]. Next, the space of signals we have considered for the upper bounds builds on the
n = 1 case [1], and it is conceivable that signals that modify the valuation distribution of multiple
buyers at once may lead to improved bounds. Such signals are challenging to analyze for reasons we
describe in Section 1.2. Finally, it is quite likely there is a separation between existence results and
computational results, i.e., there could be an existence result showing a better approximation via an
exponential complexity signaling scheme. Such separations are known for the Bayesian persuasion
problem [11], and it would be interesting to derive such results for our multi-agent setting.
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Going beyond our specific setting, it would be interesting to explore the equilibria in optimal
auctions when the intermediary can send different signals to the seller and to the buyers, much
like in [2, 17]. At an even higher level, our work can be considered a special case of a larger
problem of information intermediaries for multi-agent mechanisms. As mentioned before, in our
case, the optimal auction is the mechanism, and the intermediary can change the information to
this mechanism in order to achieve “fairness” between producer and consumer surplus. It would
be interesting to explore the question of achieving fairness by selectively regulating information to
a black-box optimizer or mechanism in more general settings.
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